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Abstract 
Hydrogen is the most talked about topic today. Besides being able to reduce carbon dioxide 
levels with combustion products that do not produce carbon dioxide or known as green energy, 
its potential as a substitute for existing energy is needed. There are two important things that 
make hydrogen needed as a substitute for existing energy. The first is the limited availability 
of hydrocarbons based on (IEO, 2019) “the global supply of crude oil, other liquid 
hydrocarbons, and biofuels is expected to be adequate to meet the world's demand for liquid 
fuels through 2050”. This must be kept in mind if future energy shortages are to be avoided. 
The second thing is concern for climate change. The use of hydrogen as a substitute for existing 
energy will reduce the level of carbon dioxide production. As we know in general that one of 
the factors for global warming is the increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
 
The higher the level of risk that is unknown and could arise over time as the use of hydrogen 
increases. Hydrogen-based systems, like any other technical system, will unavoidably include 
hazards connected with potentially dangerous conditions that endanger public safety, health, 
or the environment. Such as in this case, NORCE laboratories using hydrogen in their 
fermentation system. In order to ensure that connected products and systems are safe and 
perform as designed, safety issues must be addressed methodically for each equipment that 
involved hydrogen. 
 
Risk analysis is the right step to make a detailed understanding of risk in an event. However, 
in the case of hydrogen use, risk analysis is not sufficient. Third party services are also available 
to help create hydrogen hazard prevention applications for each piece of equipment. However, 
this seems excessive and tends to be disproportionate to the costs incurred for a research lab 
that uses hydrogen below the LEL (low explosion limit). 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to solve the problem of using hydrogen safely in the 
NORCE laboratory. Starting from a detailed understanding of the risk perspective in order to 
describe the risk of hydrogen accidental phenomena and consequences. This is important 
because it will relate to the selection of the right type of regulation and standard for designing 
risk reducing measures methods. In this case, the author uses the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC 60079) series of explosive atmosphere standards and the International 
Standard Organization (ISO 15916) regarding basic considerations for the safety of hydrogen 
systems because the potential for explosions in hydrogen release often occurs. In addition, the 
principle of risk reducing measures and emergency response plan is based on the regulations 
of Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSAN) and NORSOK Z-013. As a result, this thesis 
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Risk no matter how, whenever and whatever activities are always involved, and it is 
basically impossible to eliminate it completely unless it is accepted at some level. In general 
concept of risk management, risk can be managed in three ways; bear all the consequences or 
face the risks, take security measures to reduce potential risks and avoid risks by transferring 
them to other parties. The use of risk analysis especially quantitative risk analysis has an 
important role in making decisions in many activities such as oil and gas, medical, governance 
and policy, manufacturing, laboratories and others. There are several factors to improve the 
effectiveness of risk analysis including the strength of knowledge, information, data and expert 
opinion it all must be take into account when perform risk analysis. 
However, the use of a comprehensive risk analysis can sometimes seem overkill in some cases, 
for example in research laboratories using hydrogen even below the Lower Explosion Limit 
(LEL) and sometimes it may even cost too much to implement a comprehensive risk 
assessment or use a third-party service. This makes the costs incurred not proportional to the 
results obtained, even seem futile. This is a challenge as well as the basic idea for this thesis 
from the point of view of the risk management discipline. 
Scientists, companies and governments are increasingly interested in possible alternative 
energy sources because of concerns about global warming and climate change, as well as the 
depletion of fossil resources. Hydrogen has the potential to be an energy carrier and a viable 
substitute for hydrocarbons, especially in transportation. The advantages of hydrogen come 
from reduced carbon dioxide emissions or limited use of fossil fuels. 
In line with this, to support the use of hydrogen as a substitute energy in the future. There needs 
to be support from the point of view of proper risk management for hydrogen handling so that 












1.2. Problem Description 
Along with the increased of hydrogen usage, risk analysis should be carried out to avoid 
the hazardous of hydrogen. According to (NASA, 1997), the hazards associated with hydrogen 
use can be categorized as physiological (frostbite, respiratory disease, and shortness of breath), 
physical (phase change, component failure, and embrittlement), chemical (ignition and 
combustion). The combination of hazards occurs in many cases. The main danger associated 
with any form of hydrogen is accidentally generating a flammable or explosive mixture, 
causing a fire or explosion. Safety will be enhanced if designers and operational personnel are 
aware of the specific hazards associated with handling and using hydrogen. 
Generally, there are third party companies that help certify laboratories equipment according 
to applicable standards such as Ex-certified. However, cost plays a major role in decision 
making. As in this case, NORCE decided not to use Ex-certification in their laboratory due to 
necessity and cost. This is not a barrier to implementing safety management at NORCE labs. 
An understanding of the uncertainties of hydrogen accidental phenomena, hydrogen accidental 
consequences, and the application of principles based on international standards and 
regulations is key. 
1.3. Purpose of thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the following: 
• Discuss and defining the uncertainties of hydrogen accidental phenomena and 
hydrogen accidental consequences 
• Discuss and understanding of regulation and international standard of related 
hydrogen accidental phenomena and consequences 
• Suggest an appropriate risk reducing measures of hydrogen at NORCE laboratory 
following international standard and regulation 
 
1.4. Limitation 
The main focus in this thesis is to discuss an appropriate risk reducing measure at 
NORCE laboratories that using hydrogen in their fermentation process. International standard 
and regulation such as ISO, IEC, PSA and NORSOK that related to risk reducing principle for 
hydrogen has been use as basic idea with link to the uncertainties of hydrogen accidental 
phenomena and consequences. As a result, this thesis provides an appropriate risk reducing 
methods at NORCE laboratories such as detection measures, safety barrier and safety measures 
including emergency response plan. 
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1.5. Structure 
This thesis is structured with an effective structure and has been evaluated to make it 
easier for users or readers to understand the focus of the research. The structure of this thesis 
is divided into the following sections: 
Section two is the theocratical approach, this section divides into two sub section. The first sub 
section is discussing the risk perspective and the category, namely probability-based risk 
perspective and uncertainty-based risk perspective. Well understood of risk perspective is a 
key to describe or defined the uncertainty of some object for further analysis. And the second 
sub section is discussing the regulation (PSA Norway and NORSOK) and international 
standard (ISO and IEC) related to hydrogen and explosion atmosphere to better understanding 
of risk reducing and emergency response plan. 
Section three is the hazard and risk of hydrogen. Discussing related hydrogen accidental 
phenomena and consequences has been discuss in this section with the aim of making it easy 
to determine the uncertainty of hydrogen. 
Study case of this thesis is discussing in the section four including with discussion. Uncertainty 
of hydrogen as in this case is NORCE laboratories has been determine. As a result, suggestion 
of risk reducing measures and also emergency response plan related to the uncertainty is 
provides with following the related standard and regulation. 
The final section is giving to the conclusion. better understanding of the suggestion risk 




















2. Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical approach is presented in the first portion of this thesis, which includes 
the most important words and concepts for this thesis. To distinguish between two major ideas 
that are crucial in this thesis, the theoretical approach has been separated into two subsections. 
The first subsection contains a literature study that was chosen to better understand risk and 
risk perspectives based on probability and uncertainty. This goal is to show how the risk 
perspective is handled in case studies. We have chosen and illustrated the most crucial and 
relevant terminology and definitions. 
The second concern is with Norwegian regulations, directives, and standards. The regulations 
must be followed, while the standards offer suggestions for how to comply with the regulations. 
The most important risk-related rules have been outlined. Furthermore, as in this case of thesis, 
the recommended norms are employed as an international standard for explosion hazard.  
2.1. Risk 
In early 1621, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) first used the English word risque, 
which came from the French word "risque". while the word "risque" was first spelled as risk 
in 1655. According to OED 3rd edition, risk defined as. 
“(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a 
chance or situation involving such a possibility”. 
A concise definition of risk is given by the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (CALD), 
which defines it as “the possibility of something bad happening”. 
Following (Wikipedia) there are various definitions of risk. However, there is no one definition 
that is appropriate for all issues, hence none is presented as the proper one. Rather, the 
definition is a political option, reflecting one's opinion on the relevance of many negative 
consequences in a given circumstances (Fischhoff, Watson and Hope, 1984). Thus, the Society 
for Risk Analysis (SRA) concludes that “experience has shown that to agree on one unified 
set of definitions is not realistic”. The solution is to take a different approach to the basic 
concept and distinguish between the overall qualitative definition and the measures that go 
along with it. 
In other word, risk have different definition for different concepts like project risk, economic 
risk, environmental risk etc. but all of these refer to general definition by dictionary that was 
mentioned it above as “the possibility of something bad happening”. 
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According to (Bellaby, Flyn and Ricci, 2005), risk is generally divided into three broad type. 
The first type is linked risk assessment practice.  A risk is calculated by multiplying the effect 
of a hazard by the probability of it occurring and evaluated with uncertainty. The assessment 
is based on existing evidence and provides a "reasonable expectation" that applies as long as 
the conditions under which our current knowledge is based remain unchanged.  
The second type of risk is associated with making decisions taking into account the likelihood 
that the consequences will be different. Uncertainty is not the only statistic in this case, and 
current knowledge is insufficient to serve as a guide. Thus, risk management is taken into 
account for emergency planning actions. 
The third type is not about reasonable expectations or contingency plans for dealing with 
unintended consequences, but about people's perspectives on threats. This is exactly the same 
as one of the axioms from the black swan book, namely 'unknown-known'. For example, we 
know that a terrorist act is a threat regardless of the danger that arises as a result or an 
emergency action to deal with it. But people do not realize it, or have not identified these events 
because the assessment was lacking thorough enough consideration (Aven, 2014). 
Another semantic of risk is defined with linked to dictionary concept. It is "the possibility of 
something bad happening". Such as (Aven, 2015b), defined risk conceptually and provides an 
example related to activity. 
Risk is related to future events A and their consequences (outcomes) C. Today, we do not know 
if these events will occur or not, and if they occur, what the consequences will be. In other 
words, there is uncertainty U associated with both A and C. How likely it is that an event A 
will occur and that specific consequences will result, can be expressed by means of 
probabilities P, based on our knowledge (background knowledge) K (Aven, 2015b) . In this 
term risk is defined technically as combination between consequences (C) and uncertainty (U) 
of some event (A) and based on this definition not only the possibility bad happening or 
negative consequences could be, but also could simulate with positive consequences for 
example spread of corona virus, this may negative for mostly all people in the world, but we 
do not know actually that there are positive consequences for others. Such an increasing face 
mask productivity that makes the company increase benefit, increasing benefit to the pharmacy 
or maybe this could be healing for the world from waste gas since travelling to anywhere is 
restricted and make the production of carbon dioxide is decrease especially from the 
transportation sector. 
 6 
Let us use the hydrogen case as an example to make it closer to the current topic. Observed the 
fermentation process in a hydrogen-using laboratory. The sensor monitors and controls the 
hydrogen temperature and pressure during the fermentation process. In addition, the reactor is 
equipped with a mechanical independent pressure release device to ensure that the pressure 
limit is not exceeded. One possible outcome in this scenario is that the sensor fails to control 
the hydrogen temperature, resulting in over pressurization of the fermentation reactor. For 
simplified, fermentation process as an even A have the potential consequences C if the sensor 
fails to monitor the real temperature and pressure in the reactor. However, we do not know 
actually what the associated consequences will take place? is it the sensor will fail or not? This 
call uncertainty U and in this case, we only assess one uncertainty, and what about another 
uncertainty that could be influenced to lead an accident at laboratory? That is risk. 
 
2.1.1. Risk perspective 
The definition of risk as mentioned above is only considered as a dictionary and 
perspective. As a result, we could not have a conclusion to what an appropriate definition of 
risk for all events because risk has a different meaning for different discipline and application 
areas. Such as (PSA, 2011) defined risk as the consequences of the activities with associated 
uncertainty, (BS ISO 31000, 2018) defined risk as an effect of uncertainty on objectives, 
(NORSOK, 2010) defined risk as the combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and 
the severity of that harm, (Aven and Renn, 2010) defined risk refers to uncertainty about and 
severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something 
that humans value, Risk equals the expected loss (Willis, 2007), Risk is the probability of an 
adverse outcome (Graham and Weiner, 1995). All this perspective of risk is understood as an 
expected value, a probability distribution, as uncertainty and as an event and generally there is 
no universally accepted definition of risk. Based on these various definitions, it can be 
categorized between two perspectives. namely based on probability and based on uncertainty 
perspective (Aven and Renn, 2010). 
2.1.2. Probability based risk perspective 
The term of probability has been defined by (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981) into three 
different distinction, namely distinction between probability and frequency, distinction 
between probability and statistic, and the last is probability of frequency. Then, this distinction 
has been simplified by (Aven, 2011a) to interpreting probability into two different ways. That 
is (a) as a relative frequency and (b) the bayesian perspective. 
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a. Relative frequency 
Risk (R) is described as (A, C, P), where (A) express as the number of events, (C) as the 
consequences of event “A” and P as the probability associated of event (A) and consequences 
(C). the probability in this term is interpreted as relative frequency probability or frequentist 
probability. As an example, consider at laboratory work and we can define event (A) (such as 
gas leaks) and associated consequences (C). The probability of event Pf (A) is the fraction of 
time the event (A) occur if the situation repeated with infinite number of time (Aven, 2011b). 
 
Pf (A) in this term is unknown and need to describe. Risk analysis determines the estimate Pf* 
by using models and simulations to hypothetically repeat the situations (A). It is unknown how 
close the estimate Pf*(A) comes to the true value of P(A). 
Risk description of relative frequency probability 
R = (A, C, Pf
*, P (Pf), K) 
K expressing the background knowledge on which the estimate Pf
* and probability distribution 
P are based. Second-order probabilities, such as “P” in the example above, are included in the 
description. This probability is based on a set of assumptions and could differ in a number of 
ways. As a result, a risk description must be able to reflect the uncertainty embedded in 
background knowledge and must look beyond subjective probabilities P (Aven, 2015a). 
 
b. Bayesian perspective 
In the bayesian perspective, the analyst expresses uncertainties using knowledge-based 
(subjective) probabilities. All probabilities are dependent on background data, available data, 
and the models being used (Aven and Renn, 2010). 
Assume that the probability of event A occurring is 10%. There is no uncertainty in the assigned 
probability in this approach because it expresses the analyst's degree of belief in the event "A" 
based on background knowledge. This subjective probability can be compared to drawing a 
specific ball from an urn of ten balls. 
An analysis based on historical data could easily become too narrow, implying that extreme 
outcomes are not taken into account. The problem is that, because such events are so 




2.1.3. Uncertainty based risk perspective 
The risk perspective based on probability is a probability model that cannot always be 
meaningfully defined, as explained in Section 2.1.2, and we must thus go beyond the (A, C, Pf) 
perspective as a universal perspective. We get the (A, C, U) risk perspective by replacing the 
relative frequency probability Pf with uncertainty U. Because A and C are both subject to 
uncertainty, a “(A, C, U) perspective" is a natural contender. We want a framework that allows 
for different representations and expressions of uncertainty. As a result, risk is defined as a 
triplet comprising occurrences A, consequences C, and associated uncertainty U (will A 
happen, and what will be the repercussions C?). Various techniques, such as likelihood, 
possibility measurements, and others, could be used to describe the risk (Aven, 2011a). 
Following (Aven, 2011b) risk description based on uncertainty : 
R = (A, C, U, P, K) 
There is P in this description, means as subjective probability expressing uncertainty U based 
on the background knowledge K. In this risk description, uncertainty is the most important 
component of risk rather than probability. 
2.2. Regulation and standard 
Every workplace entails a risk, and we have no way of knowing how significant the risk 
is. Working in the petroleum industry carries a high risk, but so does working in another 
industry, particularly when working with gas, which carries a high risk, such as working in a 
laboratory that uses hydrogen as a supporter for their work. However, it should not be an 
impediment to working effectively in a high-risk industry. To ensure a safe working 
environment, regulations and standards have been established. All regulations must be read 
and understood in the context of the governing laws in order to be consistent. Furthermore, the 
authorities advise that the guideline norms, which include the application of standards, be 
followed. 
2.2.1. Norwegian regulation 
The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) in Norway sets the rules for health, safety, and 
the environment in the petroleum industry and at onshore facilities. They show how to manage 
activities in the oil industry and at onshore facilities by demonstrating the basic requirements. 
These rules are divided into the following sections: 
• The Framework Regulation 
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• The Management Regulation 
• The Facilities Regulation 
• The Activities Regulation 
• Technical and Operational Regulation 
• CO2 Safety Regulation 
• The Working Environment Regulation 
The regulations comprise a vast number of functional requirements, with standards and norms 
defining the level of prudence of the regulations. The Norwegian regulatory hierarchy is 












Figure 1. Norwegian regulatory hierarchy 
 
The PSA is supposed to establish guidelines and monitor compliance to guarantee that industry, 
particularly in the petroleum industry, adheres to high standards of health, environment, safety, 
and disaster readiness, and therefore contribute to society's maximum benefit. The PSA is in 
charge of issuing and enforcing regulations as part of its role. 
In terms of health, safety, and the environment, the PSA encourage high health, safety, and 
environmental standards in all activities covered by these rules and accomplish systematic 
execution of steps to meet requirements and meet the goals set out in workplace safety and 
health legislation.  
Following (PSA, 2011), is explain regarding risk reduction principle. As it stated that “Harm 
or danger of harm to people, the environment or material assets shall be prevented or limited 







in accordance with the health, safety and environment legislation, including internal 
requirements and acceptance criteria that are of significance for complying with requirements 
in this legislation. In addition, the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible”. Risk 
must be minimized at all times, including throughout the selection of technical, operational, 
and organizational solutions. The potential harm to persons must be assessed and minimized 
in order to obtain the greatest possible outcomes, given that the expenses are not out of 
proportion to the risk reduction that will be achieved. To lower the risk as much as feasible, 
risk-reduction methods must be given. The actions and solutions that will lessen the uncertainty 
regarding the personnel's health and safety will be picked. Furthermore, elements that 
contribute to harm to people, assets, or the environment must be replaced with ones that pose 
a lower risk of harm. 
There is uncertainty about which incidents will occur, how frequently they will occur, and what 
harm or loss of human life, health, the environment, and material assets the various occurrences 
will cause. In terms of the external environment, the uncertainty relates to the potential for 
operating discharges to cause environmental impact. There's also no way of knowing how 
much environmental damage the releases will create. As a result, the following (PSA, 2011) 
provides some guidelines relating to risk-reduction principles. 
• Risk reduction must be further reduced beyond the established minimum level for health, 
safety and environment that follows from the regulations. The enforcement will be different 
based on whether it applies to high-risk operations and activities with major accident 
potential, or similar of lesser scope and with lower risk. This means that the risk shall be 
reduced if this can take place without unreasonable cost or drawback. The ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable) principle is usually related for this concept. 
• The BAT (Best Available Technology) principle, the party in charge of the activities must 
plan and operate using technology and procedures that, after a thorough evaluation, give the 
greatest and most successful results. 
• Pre-cautionary principle, this provision is included to clarify a principle in the field of health, 
safety, and the environment that is recognized both nationally and internationally. 
• Substitution philosophy, Alternative solutions that do not include the relevant risk elements 
must be chosen. The clause extends to the entire extent of the regulations and will also apply 
to matters that pose a health risk and fall under the jurisdiction of the health authorities, such 
as the duty to substitute products that contain chemicals that are harmful to human health 
and the environment. 
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These guidelines can be used as a basic in risk analyses to show the application of risk-
reduction principles. Additionally, following (PSA, 2018) demonstrated the uses of acceptance 
criteria for major accident risk and environmental risk. Acceptance criteria define and indicate 
the top limit of what is considered an acceptable risk level in each category. Even if the results 
of risk studies or risk assessments suggest a level of risk that is within acceptable limits, 
additional risk reduction should always be addressed. The acceptance criteria must be written 
in such a way that they meet the requirements for appropriate risk and preparedness analyses 
and are acceptable for providing decision-making support in regard to risk analyses and risk 
assessments. In this acceptance criterion, a major accident is defined as an acute incident such 
as a major spill, fire, or explosion that results in multiple serious personal injuries and/or loss 
of human life, serious environmental harm, and/or loss of major financial assets immediately 
or later. 
To make a decision, of course, these two parts of regulations are not enough to be used as 
supporting factors. There are still some regulations that need to be used as a basis for making 
decisions. For example, in the case of the fermentation process in the NORCE laboratory, the 
potential for fire and explosion hazards is a major problem that needs to be addressed. The 
handling must be in accordance with the applicable regulations, in this case, the PSA. Such as 
facility regulations, which govern the design of facilities as well as the primary safety functions 
including physical barrier and emergency preparedness. To ensure staff safety and reduce 
pollution, design facilities should be based on the most robust and simple solutions possible, 
and the main safety functions must be clearly specified. In addition, PSA's technical and 
operational regulations describe regulatory standards regarding fire and explosion protection 
in order to avoid risks and with respect to fires, explosions and other accidents as possible. In 
the event of a spill or leak, the necessary precautions must be taken to avoid the risk of fire or 
explosion, including fire and gas detection systems, control and monitoring systems and 
process safety systems to maintain safe conditions in the event of a fault that could prevent the 
system from functioning. 
 
2.2.2. NORSOK Z-013 
The Norwegian Technology Standards Institution (NTS) has established NORSOK 
standards for the petroleum industry, which address both technical and operational aspects of 
safety (NORSOK, 2010). The PSA has recommended that the majority of the NORSOK criteria 
should be followed. As a result, knowing and applying these standards can help to comply with 
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the rules. The risk analysis employed in this thesis must adhere to the rules, but it should also 
incorporate the recommended standards. (NORSOK, 2010) is based on the following elements: 
• Prior to conducting a risk analysis, establish risk acceptability criteria. 
• The relationship between risk and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), particularly 
the integration of the two types of analysis into a single overall analysis process 
• Analyses preparation and execution 
• Additional risk and EPA requirements for various activities and life cycle phases. 
• Establishing regulations based on risk and the Environmental Protection Agency's 
guidelines 
As a result, throughout the risk analysis for the case studies, this standard was employed and 
referred to. The standards primary goal is to demonstrate the recommended steps that must be 
included in a risk assessment. Furthermore, because risk and emergency preparedness plans 
are emphasized, it overlaps and complies with PSA rules. These aspects should be considered 
while making the risk analysis. 
 
2.2.3. International standard for explosion hazard 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a global federation of 
national standard-setting organizations. Technical committees are typically responsible for 
preparing international standards. Each member body with an interest in a particular topic has 
the right to have a representative on the committee. On all aspects of electrotechnical 
standardization, ISO works closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
Like the NORSOK standard, ISO/IEC is a recommendation that needs to be involved in making 
a risk analysis. however, Unlike the NORSOK standard, the international standard, in this case, 
ISO/IEC, explains the guidelines related to the problems in this thesis, in this case, the hazard 
and risk of hydrogen, in greater detail. The two standards that will be presented in this chapter 
are ISO/TR 15916 regarding Basic considerations for the safety of hydrogen systems, and then 
IEC 60079-10-1 related to the discussion on Classification of areas – Explosive gas 
atmospheres. 
 
a. ISO/TR 15916: Basic considerations for the safety of hydrogen systems 
 
  (ISO/TR 15916, 2004) is an international standard or technical report regarding basic 
considerations for the safety of hydrogen systems and cover all aspect of hydrogen safety. The 
extent to which these standards are followed will vary depending on the application (such as 
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the conditions and quantity of hydrogen involved, and the way in which the hydrogen is used). 
Good appliance design, combined with proper installation care, is expected to reduce the degree 
of safety considerations to levels that are judged acceptable by the public for common 
appliances in use today. Manufacturers of hydrogen appliances will need to take these 
principles into account in order to tailor enough specific information for their appliance’s 
operation, the environment in which they will be utilized, and the audience who will use them. 
Hydrogen has been utilized safely in a variety of applications for many years. Following the 
concepts outlined in this technical report can help to ensure that hydrogen is used successfully 
in the future. 
 
b. IEC 60079: Classification of areas - Explosive gas atmospheres 
 
  (IEC 60079-10-1, 2015) is concerned with the classification of area where flammable 
gas or vapour hazard may occur, which can then be used to support the correct design, building, 
operation, and maintenance of hazardous area equipment. It is meant to be used in situations 
where flammable gas or vapour is mixed with air and could provide an ignite hazard. This 
standard's strategy entails analysing and classifying the environment in which a potential 
explosion could occur, as well as making it easier to choose, install, and operate appropriate 
equipment for safe use in that environment. The ignition characteristics of gases or vapours, 
such as ignition energy and ignition temperature, are also taken into account in the 
classification. The determination of the type of hazardous zone and the zone's area are the two 
basic goals of area classification. 
This standard is the most commonly used in terms of protection from explosion hazards and 
usually we have known as IECEx. Additionally, this standard has been used as a requirement 
in terms of planning, design, and installation for explosion protection. The Ex-standard covers 
both primary and secondary protection. Primary protection explains the basis for an explosion, 
including factors, hazardous areas, prevention of an explosion, and the method of primary 
explosion protection itself. While on secondary protection, it explains the relevance and 
advantages of the area classification in workplaces, explosion parameters, ignition temperature 
and fundamental matters, including maximum experimental safe gap (MESG) and minimum 





2.3. Risk reduction measures 
The main purpose of risk reducing measures is to mitigate or reduce the risk or 
consequences of certain activities, including safe operation and reducing consequences as well 
as emergency preparedness action (HSE, 2006). Another purpose is provided in the standards 
(NORSOK, 2010) that the risk reducing measures should take into account the reliability and 
the vulnerability of the risk reducing measures and the possibility of documenting and 
calibrating the evaluated measures of risk reduction. The steps taken to reduce the risk in each 
scenario are an important part of the risk analysis process for preventing, optimizing, or 
mitigating the effects of an accident, for example. Expert judgment and expertise can be used 
to evaluate risk-reduction techniques during the planning phase. It is critical to recognize the 
circumstances that may need a departure from earlier practices, norms, and standards. 
Following framework regulation (PSA, 2011), the risk reducing principle involved risk 
acceptance criteria (RAC) and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) as the 
recommended methods to follow. 
The main purpose of RAC is to keep the risk associated with particular activities to an 
acceptable level, which should be as low as possible (Aven et al., 2004). With respect to a 
particular amount of time or phase of the activity, RAC determines the overall risk level that is 
defined as tolerable. The RAC serves as a reference for estimating the need for risk mitigation 
measures, thus it should be ready before the risk analysis begins (Aven, Vinnem and Vollen, 
2006). 
ALARP principle states that the risk should be reduce as low as reasonably practicable, a risk 
reducing measure should be implemented provided it cannot be demonstrated that costs are 
high in comparison to the benefits achieved (HSE, 2001). The general consensus is that all 
reasonable precautions will be taken in the event of a risk that falls within the so-called 
acceptable range. This is accomplished by gradually lowering them until the expense of further 
risk reduction is roughly excessive to the benefits that can be realized. When determining the 
RAC and risk-reduction strategies, the ALARP concept is critical in ensuring that the risk is 






3. Hazard and Risk of Hydrogen 
Hydrogen is a valuable resource with limitless possibilities. The utilization of hydrogen 
technology has exploded in popularity during the last decade. Unfortunately, as usage grows, 
so does the risk of an incident. Despite the fact that some people think of hydrogen as a 
dangerous fuel, it has been utilized safely for generations in a variety of businesses. Some of 
hydrogen's qualities make it safer to handle and use than many conventional fuels today (e.g., 
hydrogen is non-toxic and much lighter than air, allowing leaks to dissipate quickly). However, 
on the other hand, necessitate unique engineering considerations in order to avoid an accident. 
Three important variables that apply to all flames adequately describe what is required for a 
fire to occur: fuel, oxidizer, and ignition. What we call fire is a "combustion" reaction, which 
is a chemical reaction of a fuel in which, in this case, hydrogen combines with an oxidizer such 
as oxygen. This extraordinary reaction can be harnessed for good under regulated conditions. 
Volatile hydrogen flames, on the other hand, can be very destructive in the wrong 
circumstances. Therefore, understanding the hazard and risk of hydrogen is the first step toward 
safety (WHA, 2021). 
 
3.1. Hydrogen safety property 
Due to the environmental and energy security benefits of hydrogen as a primary energy 
vector compared to conventional fossil fuels in terms of emissions and supply availability, the 
concept of hydrogen as a primary energy vector has received a lot of attention. The most 
prevalent element on the planet is hydrogen. Many scientists believe hydrogen will be an ideal 
future energy source, serving as both a future fuel and an energy carrier for electricity. 
Furthermore, hydrogen has other advantages, including being the most abundant element with 
a high energy content per mass (Dagdougui et al., 2018). The table below shows the property 
of hydrogen compared to other gases that are important in terms of safety. 
 
Hydrogen Methane Gasoline 
Flammability limits (vol%) 4.0–75 5.3–15 1.0–7.6 
Auto-ignition temperature (°C) 572 632 440 
Ignition energy (mJ) 0.018 0.280 0.25 
Deflagration index (bar m/s) 550 55 100–150 
Limits of detonation in the air (vol%) 13–65 6.3–13.5 1.1–3.3 
Coefficient of diffusion in the air (cm/s) 0.61 0.16 0.05 
Max flame speed in the air (cm/s) 3.06 0.39 – 
Table 1. Property of hydrogen (http://www.nrel.gov) 
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Aside from its excellent burning qualities and high energy output per unit of mass, hydrogen 
has a number of disadvantages that could threaten its safety and acceptance by the general 
people. Traditional fuels have physicochemical qualities that are vastly different from 
hydrogen as mentioned in table 1. The low ignition energy, fast flame speed, poor flame 
visibility, colourless and odourless nature, and wide flammability range which means highly 
flammable and very easily ignited are all major concerns. In addition, because hydrogen is a 
lighter gas than air, it has a tendency to ascend and spread swiftly in the atmosphere, depending 
on the direction, rate, and pressure of the release. Therefore, a hydrogen economy must include 
safe methods for the production, storage, distribution, and use of hydrogen with respect to its 
property. Any hydrogen project that fails catastrophically could threaten the entire transition 
approach. Hydrogen, like most other energy carriers, can be handled and used safely with the 
right sensing, handling, and engineering methods (Rosyid, 2006). 
 
3.2. Application of Hydrogen 
The search for alternative fuels has grown in recent years as the world's energy needs 
have grown, with hydrogen being a clear possibility. Because it provides more energy per unit 
of mass than current fuels, hydrogen is a clean energy vector that can be utilized as a substitute 
fuel. Hydrogen is being used in a variety of applications. They range from large-scale uses in 
the chemical and oil industries to small-scale applications in portable devices or laboratories 
(in gas chromatography) and others (Ruiz, 2015).  
Following (HySafe, 2007b), hydrogen application can be group into three sectors:  
• Transport 
• Stationary (industrial and residential) 
• Portable 
One advantage of hydrogen as an energy carrier is that it can easily power vehicles, 
locomotives, ships, and planes. In the transportation industry, the most advanced usage of 
hydrogen is in motor vehicles, particularly cars. This is why automobile manufacturers around 
the world are pouring money into hydrogen research and development. Internal combustion 
engines (ICEs), fuel cells, and gas turbines can all use hydrogen to power cars. ICEs, on the 
other hand, are a well-established technology that converts common liquid fuels to hydrogen 
with relative ease. As a result of these factors, some automakers are developing hydrogen-
specific ICEs. Small hydrogen-fuelled gas turbines suitable for road cars are the subject of 
research in Germany and the United States. Gas turbines, according to some, may be the 
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winning technology for using hydrogen for transportation applications. Hydrogen has been 
used for transportation in both aviation and a variety of other modes of surface transportation 
(Larsen, Feidenhans’l and Sønderberg Petersen, 2004) 
The first sector deals with mobile applications for a hydrogen economy, as well as the 
stationary applications required to establish the infrastructure needed to support these mobile 
applications, such as hydrogen filling stations. According to (HySafe, 2007b), stationary 
application divide into two parts. Namely, industrial application (above or equal to 50 kW) and 
residential (small applications using below or equal to 5 kW and large applications using under 
250 kW). In the short-medium term, it seems unlikely that direct hydrogen consumption for 
industrial or residential purposes will play a significant role. However, a growing amount of 
hydrogen for use as an energy buffer may be required in the long run. The essential 
infrastructure will have to be modified to the changing needs of the decentralized energy 
markets as they develop. 
Hydrogen also plays an important role in the portable application sector. A portable application 
in this case is the use of hydrogen as the main material supporting fuel cells or better known, 
as hydrogen fuel cells. Small fuel cells can be used in portable electronic equipment (up to 100 
W) and portable generators to replace batteries and internal combustion engines. Due to the 
weight of the fuel cell, the upper limit for a portable generator is around 5 kW. Portable 
electronic devices such as cell phones, laptops, cameras, etc. are one of the main applications 
for low-power fuel cells. Fuel cells can provide significantly more power per unit of space or 
weight than batteries but have lower output voltages and a slower response to transients. 
Portable generators, uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), auxiliary power units, power tools, 
and light vehicles such as electric trolleys, lawn mowers, and roadside equipment use fuel cells 
up to 5 kW(Larsen, Feidenhans’l and Sønderberg Petersen, 2004). 
Furthermore, hydrogen is also used in a variety of industrial operations. Apart from the 
applications listed above, its use as a raw material in the chemical industry and as a reductor 
agent in the metallurgic sector are noteworthy. Hydrogen is a key component in the production 





Figure 2. Pie chart of hydrogen uses  
The use of hydrogen in the ammonia industry is more than in other industries, as shown in the 
pie chart above. Hydrogen is used as the main raw material in the formation of ammonia. 
Hydrogen is reacted with nitrogen to form ammonia according to the following equation. 
3H2 + N2  2NH3  (1) 
While in the oil and gas industry, hydrogen is utilized in the refinement of crude oil into refined 
fuels like gasoline and diesel, as well as the removal of impurities like sulphur from these fuels 
(Ruiz, 2015). 
 
3.3. Hydrogen accidental phenomena and consequence 
In this subsection, the author will briefly describe the accidental phenomena and 
accidental consequences of hydrogen. Along with the rapidly growing use of hydrogen, as 
described in the previous chapter, the higher the risk that will be faced. Therefore, discussing 
this topic is important for knowledge to support hydrogen as a substitute for energy that is safe 
and environmentally friendly. 
3.3.1. Accidental phenomena 
The accidental phenomena in hydrogen are the same as in gases in general, it can be 
divided into three parts: 
• Release of hydrogen 
• Dispersion of hydrogen 














The result of a positive pressure difference between a container and its surroundings is gaseous 
hydrogen leaks through a hole or channel. A nozzle is commonly used to represent the aperture. 
A flow via a convergent nozzle to a lower downstream pressure can be chocked (sonic) or 
subsonic, depending on the upstream pressure. The ratio of constant volume to constant 
pressure specific heat determines the crossover pressure (Hanna and Strimaitis, 1989). In this 
case, the storage of hydrogen in the NORCE laboratory needs special attention to avoid this 
type of hydrogen release (sonic or subsonic release) due to the smallest molecule in hydrogen 
gas may enhance the likelihood of leakage through small pores and materials. In other words, 
because of its low viscosity, hydrogen is significantly more likely than other hydrocarbons to 
leak from piping connections. On a volumetric basis, hydrogen would leak three times faster 
than natural gas and five times faster than propane (Rosyid, 2006). The other way to hydrogen 
release that related to accidental phenomena is pool spreading and vaporization. The release of 
liquefied gas usually leads to the accumulation and creation of a liquid pool on the ground, 
which grows radially away from the releasing point, depending on the volume spilled and the 
rate of release, and which also begins to evaporate immediately. The pool's surface area 
expands during the initial release phase, implying a faster vaporization rate. Eventually, a state 
is attained in which the entering mass is equal to the evaporated mass. The cooling of the solid 
ground causes a reduction in heat input, resulting in a progressively growing pool size at a 
constant spill rate. Despite the ice development, the pool area and vaporization rate for the 
water surface are maximum and largely constant, as determined by lab-scale tests (HySafe, 
2007a). 
The second accidental phenomena are dispersion of hydrogen. The types of gas dispersion that 
need to take into account for in general are the dispersion in the open atmosphere, dispersion 
in obstructed environment and dispersion in confined environment. Forces coming from the 
internal energy of the gas and/or energy inside the system are primarily responsible for the 
formation of a gas cloud in the atmosphere. If there is not any early ignition, density variations, 
atmospheric conditions, and terrain all play a role in the structure of the vapour cloud. Density 
disparities between cloud and ambient air will be balanced out in the final phase due to 
atmospheric dispersion, and concentrations will eventually fall below flammability standards. 
When analysing hydrogen dispersion in a blocked environment, keep in mind that the 
dispersing cloud behaviour for gaseous and liquefied hydrogen spills is fundamentally 
different. When hydrogen escapes from the liquid state to the atmosphere, it disperses as a 
heavier-than-air gas with horizontal movement and extended dilution times, whereas hydrogen 
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is a buoyant gas in its gaseous state. Some of the results reported for the dispersion of other 
flashing liquids may be applied to hydrogen dispersion in this way. The last type dispersion is 
dispersion in confined environment, the leakage in a confined environment differs from the 
open atmosphere and semi-confined situations in that it occurs in a room. The hydrogen is 
discharged into the room atmosphere, where it either builds up or disperses externally through 
venting holes. For low-momentum, gaseous hydrogen leaks, buoyancy has a greater impact on 
gas motion than diffusivity. The direction of the release determines the gas motion in high-
pressure systems; however, in low-pressure systems, a jet is formed, which minimizes the gas's 
inertia (Venetsanos et al., 2003). 
The last accidental phenomenon of hydrogen is the ignition of hydrogen. We need to take into 
account variations in the ignition timing of the release of hydrogen, the aim of which is to 
reduce the consequences of the release of hydrogen. For flammable hydrogen-oxidant 
combinations, there are a variety of potential ignition sources. Flames, electrical sparks, fused 
wires, hot surfaces, heating, rapid adiabatic compression, shock waves, and catalytic materials 
are only a few examples. All of these processes raise the temperature of a piece of the 
combustible mixture to a point where the surrounding uncombusted layers react as well, 
resulting in a flame. A jet flame can be formed, for example, if hydrogen is ignited instantly 
(Pasman and Rogers, 2010). 
3.3.2. Accidental consequences 
Fire and explosion hazards can occur as a result of hydrogen phenomena such as release 
or dispersion, just as they do with gases in general. Based on the report (HySafe, 2007a), there 
are two type of explosion: chemical explosion and physical explosion. In chemical explosions, 
the developing blast wave transports a large percentage of the combustion energy uniformly 
dispersed in all directions. This impact is strongest at ground level (hemispherical) explosions, 
when the yield ratio might be twice that of a spherical explosion due to reflection. 
Overpressures, thermal radiation, debris or missile throwing, and the damage degree or 
vulnerability of the receiving items must all be taken into account. In the other hand, a bursting 
or rocketing pressure vessel, which can occur as a result of a fire induced BLEVE (Boiling 
Liquid Expanding Vapor Cloud Explosion), is the most common type of physical explosion. 
The BLEVE becomes increasingly damaging as the liquid density increases. A fireball will 
form if the liquid is combustible. A BLEVE generates many pressure spikes: from the flashing 
liquid, expanding vapor phase, and, if suitable, burning. However, an explosion cannot occur 
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in a tank containing only hydrogen because an oxidizer, such as oxygen, must be present in a 
concentration of at least 10% pure oxygen or 41% air for an explosion to occur (Ruiz, 2015). 
Same as explosion, fire hazard of hydrogen in general divide into two type: hydrogen flash fire 
and jet fire. Hydrogen will spread within its flammable range for many meters from the 
discharge, depending on the pressure of release, weather conditions, and the size of the smallest 
internal diameter of pipework. When a cloud of hydrogen in the open air comes into contact 
with an ignition source, it can cause a flash fire. The flame is returning to the source of the 
problem. A flash fire is a nonexplosive vapor cloud combustion that occurs when hydrogen gas 
is released into the open air (Pasman and Rogers, 2010). 
Jet fires are usually smaller than pool fires (with liquid hydrogen) or flash fires, although 
depending on the fuel discharge rate, they can be rather enormous. Jet fire is the consequence 
of the continual combustion of a flammable fuel. A leak's flames are almost completely 































4. Study Case 
4.1. Background 
NORCE or Norwegian Research Centre AS was founded in July 2017 to create a 
powerhouse for research that will lead the way in innovation, value creation and research. 
NORCE is a Norwegian government-owned research institute and it is one of the biggest 
research organization of Norway. The presence of NORCE is to convey new knowledge and 
innovative solutions that will be essential and fruitful–regionally, nationally and globally. 
Currently, NORCE has an ongoing analysis project in the laboratory. The ongoing process 
involves hydrogen as a support for the fermentation process. As a reminder that hydrogen is a 
gas that requires more attention as a hazardous gas because it is a flammable material, and 
which is often encountered in hydrogen accidents is an explosion hazard.  
Generally, there is international standard for explosive equipment such as an ISO or IEC/Ex 
certification. that applies to protective systems against explosions as well as all equipment used 
in or related to explosive atmospheres, such as electrical and non-electrical equipment, 
components and safety devices, control and adjustments necessary for the safe operation of this 
equipment and protective systems. This usually used for company that involves explosive gas 
in their process operation such as offshore installation, petrochemical, smelter etc. NORCE, in 
this case does not use this certification due to EX-certification is commonly not used in 
experimental settings such as research laboratories with reference to the regulations. It is a 
challenge for risk management field to analyse this process to make safety management and 
control measure based on risk perspective at NORCE laboratory. 
 
4.2. Process description 
Bacterial biomass utilization become a source of protein, fat and vitamins has been going 
on since the 1960s. this is commonly known as microbial protein or single cell protein. Single 
cell protein (SCP) has been suggested as one of the potential alternatives to meet the rising 
global protein demand (Garc, 2021). For SCP production, a variety of feedstocks can be used, 
ranging from human edible products like sugar to waste products like wastewater resources. 
Whether the final food product is intended for animal or human consumption determines the 
feedstock used. Additionally, SCP may be made from a number of microorganisms, including 
microalgae, bacteria, and fungi (Pander et al., 2020).  
Autotrophic bacteria that fix carbon dioxide into their cellular biomass provide one of the most 
sustainable forms of SCP because it can produce cell biomass without generating any 
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significant by-products. The following is a generalized reaction for aerobic CO2 fixation 
through H2 oxidation: 
H2 + O2 + CO2  Biomass + H2O (2) 
Another reference of chemical reaction is the one proposed for Cupriavidus necator based on 
culture estimates by (Ishizaki and Tanaka, 1990) as shown in equation below: 
21.36 H2 + 6.21O2 + 4.09 CO2 + 0.76 NH3  C4.09H7.13O1.89N0.76 + 18.7H2O (3) 
Equation (3) is similar with NORCE fermentation process. H2, O2, and CO2 are fed to the 
bioreactor, along with ammonia and minerals, for cell growth in a continuous fermentation 
system. The fermentation broth represents the liquid effluent from the bioreactor, which is 
typically characterized by 1-3 percent dry weight biomass (i.e., bacterial cells) and some 
unutilized nutrients. The effluent is sent to the downstream processing section, where it is 
mechanically dewatered and dried to remove the water. Finally, the SCP product will be spray 
dried into a powdered form that can be easily stored. Heat treatment of the effluent fermentation 
broth, alkaline treatment, or chemical extraction can all be used to reduce the nucleic acid 
content of the product (Wiebe, 2017). 
4.3. Risk reduction priority of hydrogen at NORCE laboratory 
The most serious risk associated with hydrogen use is a leak into the laboratory 
environment, which would raise the hydrogen concentration to dangerous levels. In the air, 
hydrogen has a lower explosive limit (LEL) of 4%. As a result, by emptying two 50L Hydrogen 
cylinders, the LEL of a small hermetically sealed laboratory with a volume of 500m3 can be 
reached. This can be accomplished in minutes if the leak is large enough. When high-pressure 
hydrogen is rapidly released from a cylinder, it can self-ignite.  
Explosions of hydrogen pose a significant threat. Over a wide range of concentrations in the 
range of 4.0 percent –75 percent and 18 percent –59 percent, respectively, hydrogen gas forms 
combustible or explosive mixtures with atmospheric oxygen. Vapor cloud explosions occur 
when a large amount of hydrogen is released into the atmosphere and mixes with the air to 
form a large flammable cloud before being ignited (Pasman and Rogers, 2010). The strength 
of the explosion is determined by the magnitude of confinement, which is determined by the 
degree of confinement, and can result in a blast wave that damages nearby buildings and people 
(Baraldi et al., 2009). Many studies on hydrogen stations have focused on hydrogen explosions, 
deflagrations, or detonations (Fukuda, 2004). 
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Based on the uncertainty of hydrogen hazard as mentioned above, it is important to implement 
risk reduction measures in order to safely use hydrogen in the laboratory. The core concepts of 
risk reduction, such as preventing, identifying, controlling, and/or minimizing the risk 
involved, as well as establishing an emergency response plan, must be followed when 
determining risk reduction steps. As a result, method selection is critical for a successful risk 
reduction strategy. Risk-reduction measures must follow the following priority, according to 
the standard (NORSOK, 2010). 
 
4.3.1. Probability reducing measure  
According to the standard (NORSOK, 2001) that reducing the probability of accidents 
should be favoured over reduction of consequence whenever this is technically, operationally 
and economically feasible. Which means reducing the probability of occurring related to 
hydrogen accidental phenomena such as release, or dispersion must be avoided or even 
eliminated rather than controlled.  
Due to the property of hydrogen having a very low viscosity compared to other gases, the 
tendency to release hydrogen is difficult to prevent. Pressure testing using nitrogen on pipes 
that have "leak tight" will find leaks when testing using hydrogen. However, if installed by a 
competent person, the use of the correct sealing interface and suitable components in the 
hydrogen system will greatly limit the possibility of this happening. On the other hand, the low 
energy density of hydrogen means that it results in a much lower energy leakage rate. 
Nevertheless, a high priority should be given to preventing the probability of hydrogen release. 
Therefore, to limit the likelihood and size of any leak, special attention should be paid to the 
design, installation, operation, and maintenance of hydrogen handling equipment (Pritchard, 
Royle and Willoughby, 2009). 
Another technique that can be used in terms of probability reducing measures is inherently 
safer design. Prevent accident rather than controlling is the main focus of this method. The 
table below shows the basic principle of inherently safer design that using in the chemical 




Type Typical techniques 
Minimize (intensification) • Change from large batch reactor to a smaller 
continuous reactor 
• Reduce storage inventory of raw materials 
• Improve control to reduce inventory of hazardous 
intermediate chemicals 
• Reduce process hold-up 
Substitute (substitution) • Use mechanical pump seals vs. packing 
• Use welded pipe vs. flanged 
• Use solvents that are less toxic 
• Use mechanical gauges vs. mercury 
• Use chemicals with higher flash points, boiling 
points, and other less hazardous properties 
• Use water as a heat transfer fluid instead of hot 
oil 
Moderate (attenuation and 
limitation of effects) 
• Use vacuum to reduce boiling point 
• Reduce process temperatures and pressures 
• Refrigerate storage vessels 
• Dissolve hazardous material in safe solvent 
• Operate at conditions where reactor runaway is 
not possible 
• Place control rooms away from operations 
• Separate pump rooms from other rooms 
• Acoustically insulate noisy lines and equipment 
• Barricade control rooms and tanks 
Simplify (simplification and 
error tolerance) 
• Keep piping systems neat and visually easy to 
follow 
• Design control panels that are easy to 
comprehend 
• Design plants for easy and safe maintenance 
• Pick equipment that requires less maintenance 
• Pick equipment with low failure rates 
• Add fire- and explosion-resistant barricades 
• Separate systems and controls into blocks that are 
easy to comprehend and understand 
• Label pipes for easy “walking the line” 
• Label vessels and controls to enhance 
understanding 
Table 2. Inherent safety technique (Daniel and Joseph, 2011) 
In practice, however, it may be difficult to verify the risk reduction features since they rely on 
operational methods that are seen as less trustworthy, such as preventing gas leaks from 
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operations. The probability reduction measures in risk analysis are difficult to calculate. 
Evaluations of consequence-reducing measures, on the other hand, are simpler and more 
reliable (Vinnem, 2014). 
4.3.2. Consequences reducing measure 
Fires and explosions are the most common consequences of the release of hydrogen. 
Therefore, before that happens, it is necessary to assess the uncertainty of the hydrogen release 
in order to avoid having major consequences. In this case, the consequence of reducing measure 
is divided into two parts. The first is the consequences of reducing the measure of hydrogen 
release and the second is the consequences of reducing the measure of fire and explosion. 
a. Consequences reducing measure of hydrogen release 
The result of the continuous release of hydrogen is the formation of a cloud of combustible 
gas that can quickly burn when it encounters an ignition source. This needs to be anticipated to 
avoid greater consequences such as fire and explosion.  
Because an explosive gas atmosphere can only exist if a flammable gas or vapour is present 
with air, it's important to figure out where a flammable atmosphere can form inside process 
equipment, or where a release of flammable substances can cause a flammable atmosphere to 
form outside process equipment. Gaseous hydrogen has no distinct colour or odour. It has the 
smallest and lightest molecule of any gas. As a result, gaseous hydrogen is more permeable to 
materials, has fewer leak routes, diffuses more quickly in the environment, and has greater 
buoyancy than other gases. As a result of these characteristics, released hydrogen rises and 
diffuses quickly, but if confined, it can concentrate in high spots. (IEC 60079-10-1, 2015). 
Therefore, detection measures are mandatory to be installed, especially in areas that have the 
potential for hydrogen release or leakage as a notification or alarm to immediately take 
precautions to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen release. However, it should be noted that 
the properties of hydrogen are not the same as those of hydrocarbon gases, so the selection of 
the right detector for hydrogen should be of particular concern and must comply with 
international standards. 
Furthermore, ventilation design in confined areas also plays an important role in preventing the 
formation of combustible mixtures of hydrogen. Deflagration venting is widely considered as 
the most common and cost-effective method of explosion mitigation. The following 
observations/assumptions underlying the methods (HySafe, 2006): 
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• The less confinement of a room, the lower general overpressure is seen 
• The more reactive gas, the more vent area is required for pressures to remain low 
Generally, gas or vapour released into the environment may dilute due to turbulent mixing with 
air and, to a lesser extent, diffusion due to concentration gradients, until the gas disperses 
completely, and the concentration is basically zero. Dispersion will be aided by air movement 
caused by natural or artificial ventilation. Dispersion or diffusion of a gas or vapour into the 
atmosphere is an important factor in lowering the gas or vapour's concentration below the lower 
flammable limit (IEC 60079-10-1, 2015).  
b. Consequences reducing measure of fire and explosion 
The rate at which energy is released is the key distinction between fire and explosion. 
Explosions release energy quickly, usually in a couple of microseconds, whereas fire releases 
energy slowly. Fire can also result from explosions, and explosions can result from fire. A 
common thing that is used as a basic principle to avoid fire or explosions is the fire or explosion 
triangle. To start a fire or an explosion, three conditions must be met in the fire triangle. There 
must first be a flammable or explosive element present. Second, to promote the combustion 
reaction, oxygen or an oxidant must be present. Finally, an ignition source must be supplied to 
start the reaction. In simple term, if one of the fire or explosion triangle's components is 
removed, the triangle is broken, and a fire or explosion will not occur (Daniel and Joseph, 
2011). 
A number of mitigation methods applied to limit the effects of fires and explosions have been 
provided in international standards and the relevant literature. (National Fire Protection 
Association and American National Standards Institute, 2015) Recommends the use of fire 
alarm systems, automatic fire extinguishing systems and portable fire extinguishers. Whereas 
in terms of explosion mitigation, international standards (ISO/TR 15916, 2004) suggest 
preventing unwanted hydrogen/oxidizing mixtures (such as purging, a system must be purged 
with an inert gas to remove air before introducing hydrogen into the system, and the system 
should be purged of hydrogen before being opened to the air), the use of the ventilation system 
as referred to in point (a) and minimize the sources of ignition (electrical, mechanical, and 












Figure 3. fire or explosion triangle of hydrogen (https://wha-international.com/hydrogen-fire-
risk-management/) 
In addition, because of hydrogen's high reactivity and the limited benefits predicted from active 
measures, considerable attention should be paid to finding the best passive protection 
strategies. Guidelines about gas explosions can be found in (Bjerketvedt, Bakke and van 







Figure 4. shape of compartment 
A cubical box is the best design for a compartment with explosion venting on two end walls. 












Figure 5. The effect of congestion and obstructions 
Top view of two compartments. In the layout on the left side the room blocking the vent area 
and the vessels are generating turbulence by acting as repeated obstacles. The right side show 
an improved layout. 
Furthermore, if fire and explosion cannot be avoided, then action to reduce the consequences 
of fire and explosion must be implemented. The use of an emergency response plan related to 
this event has been suggested in international standards (ISO 13702, 2015) with the aim of 
minimizing the impact of fire and explosion hazards, including on humans, preventing 
escalation to other buildings and minimizing the impact on the environment. 
4.4. Suggestion risk reduction measure of hydrogen at NORCE laboratory based on 
international standard and regulation perspective 
As we know generally in the industry and have explained in the regulations in the 
previous section, risk reduction measures usually related to the ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable) principle to keep risk at an acceptable level. That means risk reduction 
measures have been implemented. If the topic of this thesis is the fermentation process in the 
NORCE laboratory using hydrogen as a supporting process, risk reduction measures must be 
considered in order to reduce or avoid the potential consequences of accidental hydrogen 
phenomena such as hydrogen release, dispersion, or even ignition. Based on the explanation of 
the effect of hydrogen in the section three, there are two consequences that will occur if one of 
the hydrogen phenomena happens. Namely explosion hazard and fire hazard. Therefore, it is 
necessary to pay more attention to these two consequences as discussed in this subsection 
namely, how to detect potential explosion hazards or fire hazards and suggestions regarding 
safety barriers and safety measures based on international standards and regulations. 
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4.4.1. Detection measure of explosive atmosphere and hydrogen flames 
As discussed in the chapter on risks and hazards of hydrogen, the main danger of the 
accidental release of hydrogen is the hazard of explosions and fire. Because of its wide 
flammability and detonability ranges, as well as its low ignition energy, hydrogen is potentially 
more hazardous than other conventional fuels (methane, propane) or their vapours (gasoline) 
in most enclosed environments (Cracknell et al., 2003). Although the risks associated with an 
unwanted release are likely to decrease quickly in outdoor situations and/or in the presence of 
adequate ventilation due to its high buoyancy, the deployment of an adequate system for the 
detection of explosive atmospheres and fire should always be considered as a possible safety 
measure. Other methods of detecting hydrogen are required due to the limits of human senses. 
To detect the presence of hydrogen, a range of methods and detector types are commercially 
available. Many of these detectors can be used in automatic warning and control systems.  
a. Detection of explosive atmosphere 
The substances likely to be present, the location of the sources, maximum source 
strength, and dispersion conditions must all be adequately known as major prerequisites for the 
use of alarms, and the instrument performance must be appropriate to the conditions of use, 
particularly in terms of response time, alarm level, and cross-sensitivity. Individual gas alarm 
system failures should not result in dangerous conditions, and the number and position of 
measuring stations should be designed so that the expected mixtures can be recognized quickly 
and reliably. According to standard and regulation, gas alarms for use in hazardous 
environments must be licensed and adequately identified as safe electrical equipment.  
Depending on the working conditions, different types of hydrogen sensors are used. 
Electrochemical, catalytic, and thermal conductivity sensors are primarily utilized in industries 
where there is a risk of hydrogen contamination. Semiconductor-based sensors are most 
commonly employed in research labs, whereas MEMS (micro-electro-mechanic system) 
sensors are used in the aerospace and space industries (HySafe, 2006). 
As stated above, semiconductor-based sensors are most often used in research labs. Due to the 
high cost for certified Ex for explosive-atmosphere every equipment at the NORCE labs and 
based on ALARP principle that the risk reducing measures should be implemented if the cost 
is not disproportionate relative to the benefits of risk reduction. It is appropriate that the 
NORCE laboratory install a sensor of this type as the risk reducing tools.  
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There are two types of MOXs (semiconductor metal oxide), namely n-type MOXs (zinc oxide, 
tin dioxide, titanium dioxide or iron oxide responding to reducing gases (H2, CH4, CO, C2H2, 
and H2S) and p-type MOXs (nickel oxide, cobalt oxide responding to oxidizing gases (O2, 
NO2, and Cl2). MOXs (semiconductor metal oxides) have attracted a lot of attention because 
of their low cost, high and fast reaction, and relative ease of use, as well as their ability to detect 
a wide range of gases (Phanichphant, 2014). 
Following international standard (ISO/TR 15916, 2004), have recommended the use of 
hydrogen detectors wherever hydrogen is used. The locations listed below are some of the best 
places to put hydrogen detectors: 
• locations where hydrogen leaks or spills are possible. 
• at hydrogen connections that are routinely separated (for example, hydrogen refuelling 
ports). 
• locations where hydrogen could accumulate. 
• in building air intake ducts, if hydrogen could be carried into the building. 
• in building exhaust ducts, if hydrogen could be released inside the building. 
The following suggestions from (NASA, 1997) have been offered in order to develop a reliable 
hydrogen detection and monitoring system: 
• Evaluate and list all possible sources to be monitored (valves, flanges, connections, 
bellows, etc.) and provide valid justification for sources not monitored. 
• Evaluate the expected response time of the leak detection system to ensure compatibility 
with the responding safety system. 
• Provide visual and audible alarms as necessary when the worst allowable condition 
(red line) is exceeded. The allowable condition must still be in the safe range, but a 
warning indicates a problem. 
• Provide portable detectors for field operations or isolated areas and permanently 
installed detectors for remote-automated operations. 
• Utilize a program to maintain and periodically recalibrate detectors to ensure 
acceptable performance. 
• Determine the number and distribution of sampling points in the hydrogen detection 
system based on the possible leak rate, ventilation amount, and area size. Consideration 
should be given to methods of routing hydrogen to the detector. 
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As recommended above, a personal hydrogen detector is required in addition to the installed 
hydrogen detector for use by each laboratory worker in and around the hydrogen system. The 
most typical warning concentration level is 1% hydrogen (volume fraction) in the air, which is 
comparable to 25% of the lower flammability limit. This level should normally enable enough 
time to respond appropriately, such as by shutting down the system, evacuating workers, or 
taking other necessary actions. 
b. Detection of hydrogen flame 
Hydrogen is a colourless, odourless, and tasteless gas that emits relatively little light and 
colour when burned. Without specialized technology, hydrogen and hydrogen flames are 
extremely difficult to detect. Furthermore, as the smallest element on the periodic table, 
hydrogen is well-known. In practice, this means that the H2 molecules are extremely vulnerable 
to leakage. They can pass through many things that are thought to be "airtight". Hydrogen can 
even soak into metals, making them brittle and cracking (a process known as hydrogen 
"embrittlement"). 
Hydrogen flames emit far less heat than hydrocarbon flames, therefore human physical 
awareness of this heat does not occur until direct contact is established with the flame. As a 
result, a hydrogen fire in a place where hydrogen can leak, spill, or build and produce 
potentially combustible mixes may go undetected and spread despite any human direct 
monitoring. In these cases, hydrogen fire detectors can assist in taking immediate action. Fixed 
hydrogen fire detectors can be used to monitor remote operations continuously, or portable 
detectors can be used in the field. 
The following is an explanation scenario of the occurrence of the hydrogen fire made by 
(Beeson and Woods, 2003): 
• Hydrogen is released, mixes with an oxidizer, and forms a combustible mixture. The 
mixture contacts an ignition source and ignition occurs. 
• The hydrogen system is contaminated with an oxidizer as a result of improper purging 
and/or in leakage of an oxidizer, such as air. The hydrogen and the oxidizer form a 
combustible mixture, the combustible mixture contacts an ignition source, and ignition 
occurs. 
• Hydrogen or an oxidizer leak from one part of a system into another part of the system 
where a combustible mixture is formed and ignited. 
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And the following are some significant considerations to consider while choosing a hydrogen 
flame detector (ISO/TR 15916, 2004): 
• detection distance and area covered. 
• susceptibility to false alarms from sources such as the sun, lightning, welding, lighting 
sources and background flare stacks. 
• response time. 
• sensitivity to appropriate radiation spectrum. 
Based on the suggestion above, we need to take it into consideration to have such a clear 
understanding as a guide related to the hydrogen flame detector to be installed at the NORCE 
labs. There are several types of hydrogen flame detector technology recommended by (NASA, 
1997) and can be used as a reference for the installation of hydrogen flame detectors at NORCE 
labs. 
• Thermal fire detector classified as rate-of-temperature-rise detector and overheat 
detector have been manufactured for many years and are reliable. Thermal detectors 
need located at or very near the site of a fire. 
• Optical sensor for detecting hydrogen fires fall into two spectral regions: ultraviolet 
(UV) and infrared (IR). UV system are extremely sensitive; however, they are 
susceptible to false alarm and can be blinded in foggy condition. Infrared system 
typically are designed for hydrocarbon fires and are not very sensitive to hydrogen 
fires. 
• Imaging system mainly are available in the thermal IR region and do not provide 
continuous monitoring with alarm capability. The user is required to determine if the 
image being viewed is a flame. UV imaging system require special optic and very 
expensive. Low-cost system, using low-light silicon charge coupled device (CCD) video 
technology with filters centred on the 940- and 1100-nm emission peaks. Have been 
used at some facilities. 
• A broom has been used for locating small hydrogen fires. The intent is a dry corn straw 
or sage grass broom easily ignites as it passed through a flame. A dry fire extinguisher 
or throwing dust into the air also causes the flame to emit visible radiation. This 
technique should be used with care in windy, outdoor environments in which the light 
hydrogen flame can easily be blown around. 
Detection could include keeping an eye on an unattended site or looking for signs that are not 
visible to on-site staff in order to take action before the accident gets out of hand. Detection 
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addresses both needs in the case of hydrogen flames. However, we have noted that 
distinguishing hydrogen-related signals from parasitic signals may be difficult. As a result, it 
may be preferable to prioritize human analysis and actions above automatic ones in order to 
avoid false alarms and related automatic actions. 
 
4.4.2. Safety barriers and safety measures 
The usage of hydrogen carries a number of risks, not all of which are well understood or 
known. However, there is no reason why hydrogen should not be considered as an energy 
substitute in the future. The use of proper safety barriers and safety measures helps to 
significantly reduce risks and potential consequences. There are two types of actions in this 
subsection: mitigation measures and emergency response. In this case, NORCE labs, 
international standards and regulations for hydrogen systems can be used as guidance to acquire 
an acceptable safety barrier and safety measures. Various worldwide organizations and 
researchers have undertaken various efforts in this area over the last decade with the goal of 
making hydrogen a safe future energy. 
 
a. Mitigation measure 
When working with hydrogen, there are a lot of unintended consequences that can occur. 
The hazard will vary greatly depending on the situation and surroundings. In an unconfined 
process facility, a large leak of hydrogen gas may be safe, but if ignited within a building, a 
much smaller leak could be disastrous. Loss of life or harm to persons, property, reputation, 
and other consequences are all possible consequences. This chapter will go through several 
approaches and strategies for potentially lowering the risk of undesirable events (i.e., lowering 
the frequency and/or severity). 
Hydrogen mitigation measures should take into account the accidental hydrogen phenomenon 
as described in part two of this thesis. There are three accidental phenomena that must be 
monitored and mitigated: dispersion (limiting the amount of flammable), fire hazard (limiting 
fire load and consequences), and explosion hazard (limiting pressure generation and 
consequences). The following is a proposed example of a protective measure for this accidental  




• Dispersion (limiting the amount of flammable) 
 Confine leak exposed area either by solid casing or by soft barriers (polyethylene 
sheets). This may limit flammable cloud size, by physically limiting the cloud or 
reducing the momentum of a jet release. 
 Reduce confinement near leak-exposed area to allow buoyancy driven dispersion 
transporting hydrogen away. 
 Natural ventilation, forced ventilation, emergency ventilation to remove hydrogen 
 Removal of ignition sources to reduce explosion frequency. 
 Igniters (or continuous burners) to ensure that gas clouds are ignited before they 
grow too large to limit consequences. 
 Catalytic recombiners to remove unwanted hydrogen. 
 Inert gas dilution after release but prior to ignition, reducing the reactivity. 
 Fine water-mist dilution to reduce flammability, or sprinklers to improve 
mixing/dilution 
 Rapid injection of dense hydrocarbon gas (e.g., butane) with much lower reactivity 
than hydrogen. 
 Detection, activate shut-down (ESD), pressure relief, and safety measures, move 
people to safe place. 
• Fire hazard (limiting fire load and consequences) 
 Proper design against heat loads 
 Passive fire protection to protect equipment and increase time before escalation 
 Sprinkler systems and water deluge to cool equipment and control flames 
 Inert gas systems or fine water mist to dilute oxygen and reduce heat generation. 
 Avoid feeding oxygen into fire by proper confinement, limit ventilation. 
• Explosion hazard (limiting pressure generation and consequences) 
 Proper design against pressure loads, particular focus on manned areas and 
control rooms, as well as structures that can give escalation when failing. 
 Explosion vents allowing overpressure to be vented 
 Layout optimisation to limit turbulence generation 
 Water deluge or mist generation ahead of flames cooling the flame 
 Suppression systems quickly putting up inert atmosphere (powder, inert gas, water 
mist or too rich flammables) ahead of flame 
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 Flame isolation by fast acting closing valves or flame arresters (Maximum 
Experimental Safe Gap, MESG) 
 The use of large balloons to prevent flammable mixtures in certain regions, but still 
give volume for gas expansion during explosion. Similar “soft barriers” could be 
used to limit combustion near ceiling (in flame accelerating beams) or other places 
with significant congestion. 
 Separation distances to avoid incidents to escalate to other parts of plant or to 
protect neighbours. 
 Absorbing/collapsing walls to reduce reflected shockwaves. 
 Introduce heat absorbing material, like porous elements made of thin aluminium 
foils or similar 
Because the list of probable circumstances is so extensive, this selection will not include all 
risk-reduction options. One thing to keep in mind is that some of the actions may appear to be 
paradoxical from a risk perspective, and it is not always clear whether risk is decreased or 
raised. For example, in the mitigation step of hydrogen dispersion above, removal of the 
ignition source vs ignition on purpose. If small gas clouds are always ignited, the frequency of 
explosions may grow, but the consequences are expected to be lessened, resulting in a risk that 
is presumably acceptable. Increased confinement, for example, can lower cloud size while also 
increasing pressure and the likelihood of unfavourable outcomes. 
Another issue with mitigation devices is that they are typically tested in idealized scenarios 
(empty spherical vessel with central ignition), but then used in real-world scenarios where 
geometry will affect performance. 
Logically in the three accidental phenomena above, we have to take into consideration at the 
hydrogen dispersion. We can eliminate the further consequences such as explosion and fire 
hazard when we can prevent hydrogen dispersion occur. Another way is to mitigate if the 
dispersion when it occurs. Based on the international standard of explosion (IEC 60079-10-1, 
2015) and (ISO/TR 15916, 2004) have addressed of design of ventilation system to mitigate 
the further consequences of hydrogen dispersion. Generally, gas or vapour released into the 
atmosphere can be diluted by turbulent mixing with air and, to a lesser extent, diffusion driven 
by concentration gradients, until the gas disperses completely, and the concentration is 
basically zero. Dispersion will be aided by air movement, whether from natural or manmade 
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sources. Due to higher evaporation on an exposed liquid surface, increased air movement may 
also speed up the discharge of vapour. 
The following are basic functional that must be achieved in ventilation design based on 
international standards (IEC 60079-10-1, 2015): 
• To increase the rate of dilution and promote dispersion to limit the extent of a zone. 
• To avoid the persistence of an explosive atmosphere that may influence the type of a 
zone. 
 
The following are some other considerations for ventilation systems (ISO/TR 15916, 2004): 
• Ventilation should be established prior to hydrogen being introduced into a confined 
space and continue until hydrogen is removed from the confined space. 
• Ventilation should not be shut off as a function of an emergency shutdown procedure 
unless the source of hydrogen is outside the confined space. 
• Suspended ceilings and inverted pockets in confined spaces should be avoided or 
adequate ventilation of these spaces should be ensured. 
• Electrical equipment in the ventilation system should meet appropriate provisions for 
operation in a combustible environment. 
 
In a non-ventilated enclosed location, hydrogen leaks or spills can easily generate ignitable gas 
mixes. As a result, active or passive ventilation should always be present in confined spaces 
including equipment for handling or storing hydrogen. This ventilating system should be 
supported with hydrogen detectors especially in the restricted space such as NORCE labs to 
detect the presence of hydrogen and prevent the formation of a flammable mixture due to the 
diffusion of a gas or vapour into the atmosphere is an important factor in reducing the 
concentration of the gas or vapour below the lower flammable limit.  
We must also acknowledge the threats that can develop from flames and hot combustion 
products that will come out of the ventilation system must be considered when building the 
ventilation system. They must be disposed of in a secure location, away from personnel and 
without causing damage to the surrounding equipment. This is especially true for ventilated 
equipment that is inside building such as NORE labs. Installing ducting on the ventilation 
system to divert the discharge to a safe region, ideally outside the building, is one solution to 
this problem. However, the installation of ducting will increase flow resistance, and any 
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unburned gas discharged into the duct could cause a secondary explosion. The overall impact 
is that the flow through the vent is reduced, resulting in a reduction in the explosion pressure. 
To reduce vent inefficiency, ducting should be kept as short as possible, with no bends or 
excessive radius bends, and a cross-sectional area at least as large as the vent itself (NFPA 68, 
2002).  
b. Emergency Response  
Essentially, the same emergency response methods that are available for gas can also be 
used for hydrogen-related accidents. However, because hydrogen is more reactive than other 
hydrocarbons, existing methods must be modified. Active firefighting, for example, is less 
effective than for other hydrocarbons, so a greater emphasis will be placed on comprehensive 
emergency response planning. The emergency response plan should take into account the key 
dangers that are expected and should try to reduce the risk to individuals. Furthermore, the 
emergency plan must be in writing and include the specific activities that employers and 
employees must follow to protect employee safety in the event of a fire or other emergency. 
There are no specific standards governing emergency response methods for hydrogen. 
Therefore, they may be extracted from other areas where extensive emergency planning is seen 
as essential. (NORSOK, 2010), for example, covers both risk assessment performance and 
environmental preparedness assessment. The standard is organized in such a way that it is 
simple to identify the requirements that apply to each process separately. As a result, the 
standard can be applied when only one of the two processes is required. If/when both 
procedures are to be conducted "simultaneously", or during the same period of a project, the 
two processes should be integrated and/or coordinated to the greatest extent practicable. In 
many circumstances, the input data and outcomes generated by one process will be used as 
input to the other process, and vice versa. As a result, the two processes have merged to some 
extent. 
Another international standard for reference guidelines of emergency response is (ISO 15544, 
2010). Generally, the main principle of this standard is slightly similar to NORSOK. The 
systematic identification of hazards, followed by appraisal and risk management, is a core 
principle in emergency planning. The emergency response strategy, which describes the 
general philosophy of how the organization, procedures, equipment training, and other 
measures are supposed to work together to deal with foreseeable incidents – even if an 
emergency response measure fails. For example, direct mitigation measures for a hydrogen 
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leak could include the shutdown of ignition sources upon gas detection to prevent ignition. This 
precaution may not be effective and may even cause ignition. Hence, warning and escape 
measures, as well as evacuation routes, must be included in the strategy. Furthermore, because 
all of these methods rely on the detection and notification of a hydrogen leak, the detection and 
communication systems must be extremely reliable. 
NORSOK and ISO both explain communication methods. This is one of the critical 
components of the emergency response plan. Technical measures, organization, processes, and 
training will all be tailored to each other and the overall plan for effective communication. 
Effective emergency response is impossible if communication fails. Technical communication 
methods could trigger automatic activities such as prevention and mitigation actions like 
cutting off electrical power or initiating an alarm, emergency ventilation, allowing for manual 
intervention or even escape. Mobilization and communication within the emergency response 
organization, as well as mobilization of external resources, will require technical 
communication measures. All of these measures must be extremely reliable, and in 
circumstances when human action is required (mobilization, intervention, or escape), the 
recipient's ability to receive the message and interpret the critical information must also be 
taken into account. In addition, an organization designed and prepared for emergency response 
is also required for effective emergency response. The lines of communication should be fully 
understood and practiced, preferably on a regular basis. Within the organization, emergency 
procedures should be known and tested, particularly the function and use of communication 
technology. 
c. Response to fires and explosions 
Gas or hydrogen leakage is generally difficult to extinguish. The appropriate action for 
hydrogen ignition is to keep the surrounding area as safe from fire and explosion effects as 
possible and to avoid escalation. According to international standard (ISO 13702, 2015), the 
purpose of this section is to develop facilities that will allow people to deal with fire and 
explosions. The functioning and position of the equipment provided to allow workers on the 
installation to manage fires and explosions can have a big impact on how well they can use it 
in an emergency situation. As a result, the fire and explosion system (FES) will consider 
limiting the exposure of employees involved in fire and explosion management. Below are 
several considerations must be followed to obtain an effective response to fire and explosion: 
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• Automating shutdown and control actions to limit the need for staff on the location to 
make complex decisions in an emergency situation. When manual initiation is used, the 
systems shall be simple to operate and shall not require operators to make complex or 
non-routine decisions. Once initiated, all control actions shall occur automatically.  
• Presenting critical information at a control station so that personnel involved in 
managing an emergency have the information they need.  
• Providing the functions and controls that will allow those on the location to initiate any 
emergency actions they decide is needed.  
• Locating any emergency controls or equipment that are required for operation in a fire 
or explosion, such that there is a good prospect of being able to use them under 
emergency conditions.  
• Limiting the amount of physical and mental effort required to perform their emergency 
response role effectively. 
In addition, those who are responsible for safety-critical actions must have demonstrated ability 
to do their duties in emergency situations. To maintain the required skill levels, regular training, 
workouts, and drills must be used. Other than that, reliable means of communication between 
sites that can be occupied, or must be occupied, must be provided. 
 
4.5. Discussion  
This section will include a discussion and recommendations for future work on risk-
reduction measures in the context of hydrogen use at NORCE labs according to international 
standards and regulations. The main issue is how to address and identify the risk of using 
hydrogen in NORCE labs. As a result, risk-reduction measures were implemented in 
accordance with regulations and in order to achieve proper risk management. The discussion 
refers to a related journal article, book, regulation and international standard as a basis thinking 
for problem solving and recommendations in the risk management of hydrogen at NORCE 
labs. 
Basically, the safe use of hydrogen is possible if the property of this energy carrier is taken into 
consideration. The related safety management, as with any other flammable gas, requires 
understanding from multiple disciplines. Material compatibilities, CFD (Computational Fluid 
Dynamics) calculations for dispersion, detailed chemistry for ignition, reactive flows in 
transitional states like flame acceleration and deflagration-detonation-transition and structural 
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integrity considerations encounter new applications, operational modes and new materials in 
the hand of the public user. 
The safety factor of the use of hydrogen should not be a barrier to using hydrogen as a substitute 
for energy. The use of hydrogen, particularly in the transportation sector, should be encouraged 
because it is a good step toward reducing carbon dioxide emissions from the combustion of 
existing fuels. This is due to the fact that hydrogen does not emit carbon dioxide during 
combustion, making it a clean energy source. 
In fact, hydrogen has long been used safely in the chemical, manufacturing, and utility 
industries. But only limited to people who have done a series of training on the operation and 
handling of hydrogen. Of course, this is a barrier that makes hydrogen limited to general use. 
One step toward making hydrogen safe for general use is to adhere to the principle of risk 
reduction measures based on regulations and international standards. 
Risk analysis for hydrogen specifically is still very limited and not yet available. For example, 
the ignition behaviour of especially cold clouds under atmospheric conditions is not well 
understood. The same applies to transition phenomena such as flame acceleration and the 
deflagration to detonation transition are well studied under ideal conditions (perfect premix, 
simple geometry), but for realistic scenarios (with inhomogeneous mixtures, realistic 
geometries), there is a lack of knowledge.  
The discussion in section three regarding the hazard and risk of hydrogen is only based on the 
journal literature, regulations and international standards. When applied to hydrogen, many of 
the particular or general guidelines that have been successful in assessing risks associated with 
typical gas energy carriers have not been shown to be entirely conservative. This gap 
immediately involves difficulties in designing appropriate mitigation, including sensor 
techniques, ventilation systems and emergency response plans. Of course, this becomes a 
problem if risk reducing measures only link up to one guideline. As a result, the authors 
combine a number of related standards and regulations, as well as lessons learned from the 
hydrogen accident, to create appropriate risk management.  
The main thing that is of concern in handling hydrogen is to understand the accidental 
phenomena and accidental consequences of hydrogen as discussed in section three. Hydrogen 
release, hydrogen dispersion and hydrogen ignition are hydrogen accidental phenomena that 
need to be understood before designing hydrogen handling measures. Fire and explosions are 
the most frequent accidental consequences in terms of hydrogen accidents. 
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Based on the discussion of section three related to accidental phenomena and accidental 
consequences of hydrogen, the authors decided to use the ISO 15916 and IEC 60079 standards 
by complying with the general rules of regulations such as PSA Norway and NORSOK Z-013 
to make recommendations for risk reducing measures in the context of NORCE labs, such as 
those which have been discussed in section three. As a result, a comprehensive risk analysis is 
needed considering that hydrogen is very reactive compared to other hydrocarbons. However, 
in the case of NORCE labs, a comprehensive risk analysis seems too much for a research lab. 
In addition, data management related to hydrogen properties such as statistical approach, 
calculation of dispersion, detailed chemistry for ignition is still rare and not yet available. 
Therefore, the author concludes that the main thing that needs to be understood in the context 
of a research lab is a detailed understanding of the hydrogen accidental phenomenon. Because, 
in general, the consequences of hydrogen accidents are the same as other hydrocarbons, namely 
fire and explosion. Therefore, a detailed analysis of hydrogen accidental phenomena such as 
uncertainties or probability related to hydrogen accidental phenomena needs to be carried out 
to determine the appropriate risk reducing method. 
From a risk perspective point of view, the hydrogen accidental phenomenon is an event (A), 
and the hydrogen accidental consequence is (C). There are uncertainties (U) related to (A) and 
(C) about whether event (A) will occur and what the consequences will be (C). The author 
limits the analysis of uncertainties to focus on accidental phenomena (A) and makes mitigation 
or emergency response plan when consequences (C) occur to reduce the impact of explosion 
or fire propagation.  
uncertainties on hydrogen accidental phenomena based on lessons learned that occurred on Jun 
28, 2010 (hydrogen explosion in university biochemistry laboratory). This condition is 
somewhat the same as that discussed in this thesis, namely the fermentation process using 
hydrogen in the NORCE lab. There are several uncertainties based on this incident, ranging 
from non-technical such as human error or misunderstanding related to standard operating 
procedures for hydrogen handling and technical such as equipment design. As a result of 
combining international standards with regulations and lessons from hydrogen accidents, the 
following recommendations have been discussed in this section: 
• In terms of preventing the occurrence of accidental hydrogen phenomena, it is highly 
recommended to carry out periodic checks of the hydrogen lines before, during and 
after operation. 
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• Detection measures (both installed and portable) and ventilation design are important 
in planning risk reduction actions. 
• Based on regulations applicable to the Norwegian Petroleum safety authority and the 
NORSOK Z-013 standard, discusses the importance of emergency response plans as 
part of risk management. 
• Fire and explosion mitigation such as response is one part of the action to minimize 
the danger from accidents to equipment, personal and or the environment. 
• Training of personnel should contain standard safety measures and a more specific 







































The release of hydrogen in laboratory fermentation processes can easily cause fires and 
explosions given that ignition sources can be found in the equipment involved. To prevent their 
occurrence and reduce the consequences of hydrogen release, key among these are principles 
of safer design, use of effective safety management systems, and inspection of prior incidents 
for learning. All of these link to the risk reducing methods in this thesis. 
Basically, international standards and regulation are based on lessons learned from past 
incidents and accidents, a scientific approach and public expectation. Therefore, understanding 
the uncertainty of hydrogen accidental phenomena and consequences with the use of 
international standards and regulation is an appropriate way to design risk-reducing methods. 
Since the use of hydrogen in the fermentation process in the NORCE laboratory is below the 
LEL (Lower Explosion Limit), the detection measure is critical to anticipate any unwanted 
hydrogen release with the assumption that a standard emergency response plan must be 
implemented. In addition, communication is essential in supporting an effective emergency 
response. As mentioned in section four, technical communication methods could trigger 
automatic activities such as prevention and mitigation actions like cutting off electrical power 
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